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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

DORIS E. WELLS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

No. 8015

RAY A. WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
" ... Only occasionally have superior minds closely
considered the principals involved and undertaken to
define, with care, the boundaries of the jurisdiction
of courts and the circumstances under which their jurisdiction will and will not attach."
(14 Am fur, Courts, #159)
This appeal primarily involves two legal 1ssues which
apparently have not been ruled upon by the Supreme Court
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of the State of Utah. The first issue relates to the jurisdiction
of the District Courts of this state in divorce actions; the second
issue involves an interpretation of Rule 15(b) and .(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the power of a court
to permit plaintiff -respondent (the losing party), after trial
and judgment, to file and to recover judgment upon amended
and supplemental pleadings which set forth an entirely new
theory of recovery inconsistent with, and repudiated by, all
prior pleadings of that party.
The lawsuit involved in this appeal was initially· brought
by the respondent, hereinafter designated as the plaintiff,
against this appellant, hereinafter designated as the defendant,
upon a complaint containing two separate counts asking for
support and alimony for the plaintiff and the minor child of
the parties. The jurisdictional issue involved is primarily one
of whether or not a non-resident divorced woman, without
any Utah residency or domiciliary background, can enter the
courts of Utah for the purpose of securing alimony and support
for herself and the minor child of the parties from a former
husband who secured a divorce from her in a Nevada proceeding 2¥2 years prior thereto, she assuming the Nevada decree
to be valid as to dissolving the marital status, but claiming
the right to secure alimony and support in an "independent"
action.
This defendant contends that the District Courts of Utah
do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of such actions.
This defendant further maintains that the plaintiff has followed
an improper procedure throughout the action and must resort
to the proper procedures provided by law for seeking what-

4
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ever relief she is entitled to so that he at the same time may be
accorded adequate representation in the matter.
The second chief issue relates to the limits of discretion
which our District Courts can exercise under Rule 15 (b) and
(d) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in permitting a plaintiff
who has brought an action to trial on a substituted theoryraised by a "Reply"-that the Nevada decree of divorce secured
by this defendant was null and void by reason of being fraudulently obtained and lacking jurisdictional requirements, and
who failed to prevail on such theory, to thereupon, after trial,
and in the absence of any evidence in support thereof, petition
the court to allow her, after previously unequivocally maintaining the applicable portion of the Nevada divorce decree
to be invalid, to set up that very provision of the Nevada
decree as a new cause of action in an "Amended and Supplemental" pleading, and to recover judgment against this defendant upon such amended pleadings on a subsequent Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York. This
defendant was a resident of the State of Utah when this action
was commenced. Plaintiff and defendant intermarried at
Watertown, New York, on April 4, 1943, and had a daughter
born as issue of said marriage, now of the age of approximately
nine years.
On October 6, 1949, this defendant, after establishing
residence in the State of Nevada, secured a decree of divorce
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from the plaintiff, she having been personally served with
summons and a copy of the complaint by constructive service
in the State of New York. She did not appear in or contest
the proceedings nor did she appeal from the same. The decree
entered in the Nevada court did not provide alimony for the
plaintiff, but did provide the sum of $35.00 per month as child
support for the minor child of the parties. Shortly after securing the decree, this defendant remarried, moved to Utah, and
became a resident of this state.
On or about June 19, 1952, plaintiff filed an action in the
Third District Court of Utah, seeking relief on two separate
counts. The first count assumed the Nevada decree to be valid
insofar as it dissolved the marital status between the parties,
but denied its validity as to the right of the plaintiff to receive
alimony for herself and support money for the minor child
(R. 2). The complaint prayed that the court fix and determine
the amount of alimony to be paid to plaintiff and the amount
of support money to be paid to the plaintiff for the minor child
of the parties notwithstanding any provision of the Nevada
decree (R. 3).
The complaint was composed of two counts ("causes of
action") substantially as follows:
COUNT I. To secure child support and alimony for
herself in an "independent" action, separate and apart
·from seeking an actual divorce, as to the future.
COUNT II. To secu~e reimbursement for pas/
amounts expended for child suppor~ and alimony for
herself from October 16, 1948, unttl the time of the
filing of the complaint.
6
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In addition, an Order to Show Cause, attached thereto,
asked for temporary support and alimony and temporary attorney's fees pending the litigation. However, the relief sought
by this and two similar subsequent motions raised by plaintiff
(one of which asked for travel expenses for plaintiff from
New York to Utah for the purpose of appearing at the trial)
were denied by District Judges Martin M. Larson (R. 4) and
David T. Lewis (R. 40) for the reason that no marital status
existed upon which such orders could be made.
Defendant thereupon (by Amended Answer-R. 21)
answered the complaint (as amended by interlineation (R. 2)
to delete the plaintiff's claim for past amounts allegedly owing
for her own support) and admitted that the Nevada decree
was not binding on the subject of child support, but asserted
that it was binding upon the plaintiff's right to receive alimony.
In addition, defendant affirmatively alleged that the parties
had entered into an agreement prior to securing the Nevada
divorce whereby the plaintiff had agreed not to ask for support
money for herself or the minor child of the parties upon the
condition that defendant would not molest the child nor ask
for its custody, and alleged that he had complied with the
agreement in all particulars. The foregoing defense was raised
only as to the second cause of action which asked for past dtte
amounts expended for child support up to the commencement
of this action. This defense was permitted to stand, against
plaintiff's objection, by Judge Baker and was also acknowledged
by Judge VanCott (see infra).
This defendant admitted that the minor child could recover
on its own behalf in the event of futu1'e need, notwithstanding
7
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any agreement between the parties, but further affirmatively
alleged that child support in the past haa not been contributed
by the plaintiff, but had been contributed by other persons.
Defendant also took the position (R. 8) that the Third
District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action and could not grant the relief prayed for.
After this defendant had filed his Amended Answer,
plaintiff was permitted, over the objection of defendant raised
before Judge Baker by a Motion to Strike and Dismiss, to file
a Reply (R. 19) in the action. The Reply asserted in substance
that the Nevada decree was null and void.
On April 7, 1953, after a "trial" in the above case, at
which neither the plaintiff nor any witnesses on her behalf
appeared, and after subsequently permitting plaintiff to file
an Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R. 44) after she
failed to prevail in the trial of the action, Judge Ray Van Cott
granted judgment to the plaintiff (R. 103) on the Amended
and Supplemental Complaint. This was based, in part, upon
a finding of fact (R. 101) to the effect that the Nevada decree
was valid and subsisting in all respects. As indicated, this
judgment was based upon the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint filed by the plaintiff after the adverse ruling of
Judge Van Cott after a trial which was based on the Complaint
and the Reply filed in the original action.
Plaintiff was given a money judgment for $1,435.00
accumulated child support under the Nevada decree and
$200.00 attorney fees (the matter of attor~y· s fees being raised
only by the Amended and Supplemental Complaint), and
8
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defendant was ordered to make payment of the sum of $35.00
per month, as per the Nevada decree which was established
as a decree of the Third District Court, on and after April 1.,
1953.
To simplify the events which have taken place in the past
year in this case, suffice it to say that many objections, arguments
and motions were made before various judges of the Third
Judicial District, the total of which consume more than three
pages of docket entries. Since many of them are only incidentally
material to the issues raised on this appeal, the record has been
abbreviated as much as possible for the benefit of this court.
NOTE: Wherever italicized material appears in any text
or quoted provision in this brief, the same has been added.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Defendant submits the following points as reasons for
seeking a reversal of the judgment of the lower court:
I. The Third District Court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint to which the relief
prayed for was related.
II. Even if the court had jurisdiction, it erred in permiting the filing of the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint after trial.
III. Even if the court had jurisdiction and if it properly allowed the filing of amended and supplemental
pleadings, it erred in granting judgment on the amended
and supplemental pleadings.
9
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ARGUMENT

(I)
The Third District Court had no jurisdiction over thE
subject matter of the complaint to which the relief prayed fot
was related.

The two counts of plaintiff's complaint set forth purported
causes of action asking for support and alimony for the plaintiff
and the minor child of the two parties. In so doing, ~e plaintifl
assumed that the Nevada decree of divorce was valid only in·
sofar as it dissolved the marital relationship, but contended
that she should have the right to bring an "independent" action
for the purpose of securing alimony for herself and support
for the minor child of the parties without asking for a divorce.
As authority for bringing such an action, the Utah case
of Hutton vs. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac. 165, is cited. In
that case the wife--a resident of Utah-brought a Utah divorce
proceeding. Personal service of the husband in Utah could not
be effected. Thereupon, she was granted a divorce based upon
constructive service of process, but the decree specifically left
open the matter of alimony until the defendant could be per·
sonally served in Utah. In ruling on the case, our court felt
that the husband could not thereafter be brought before the
court by service of a motion since it would not give jurisdiction
of the person, but stated that a separate independent action
would lie
..... in a case of this kind, where jurisdiction of the
defendant is afterwards seasonably obtained and the
rights of third parties have not intervened .
"
10
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Note: This defendant remarried soon after the Nevada decree was issued, and came to Utah where he
resided for more than 21/z years before any demand was
made upon him by his former wife. She, at all times,
was aware of his whereabouts (R. 88 and 72).

Sec. 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Disposition of Property and Children.

rrw hen a decree of divorce is made the court may
make such orders in relation to the children, property
and parties, and the maintenance of parties and children, as may be equitable; ... Such subsequent changes
or new orders may be made by the Court with respect
to the disposal of the children or the distribution of the
property as shall be reasonable and proper."
The foregoing statute clearly provides that there must
at least be an antecedent Utah divorce proceeding before the
rule of Hutton vs. Dodge)s to apply. Hutton vs. Dodge is an
exception to the general rule that alimony and support can
only be granted as an incident to a divorce proceeding. However, the courts, writers and annotators have been careful to
limit it to situations where
(a) the wife was the moving party originally; and
(b) Where the original divorce proceeding was commenced in the same state.
See 42 ALR 1386-7:
"II. Divorce decreein same state or country.
A. Procured by wife."
(with discussion of the case of Hutton vs. Dodge)
In connection with the foregoing ALR citation, one other
case in addition to Hutton vs." Dodge was cited as an exception
11
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to the general rule. That case involved a decision of the court
of Massachusetts. However, upon examining and reading the
Massachusetts case, it can be seen that the exception in that
situation was provided by statute and not by court decision
alone. Hutton vs. Dodge seems to be about the only case where
the foregoing limited exception has been superimposed upon
statutory law by court decision. It seems clear, however, that
an application of the rule set forth in the case of Hutton vs.
Dodge was never intended to apply to non-residents entering
our courts.
Hutton vs. Dodge is based upon the premise that the wife,
being the moving party, never had the opportunity of having
her "day in court." It is interesting to note that had the plaintiff
in this action sought to contest the Nevada decree (wherein
she was defendant), or otherwise make any appearances in such
action, the courts of Nevada would have furnished her with
travel expenses (which she unsuccessfully sought to secure
in this Utah proceeding) to take her to Nevada from New
York. This rule was recognized in the Nevada case of Ormsley
vs. District Court, 51 Utah J.39, 276 Pac. 14.
Now when we attempt to apply the rule of Hutton vs.
Dodge to a non-resident woman entering our courts we meet
this problem: By what authority do our courts acquire jurisdiction to entertain the action?
This defendant asserts that our courts lack jurisdiction of
the subject matter of such an action.
"There was no common law right of divorce.
Divorce is purely a matter of statute."
12
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]elme z·s. ]elme, 98 NE 2d 401, 22 ALR 1300, 155
Ohio St. 226.

Divorce was not recognized at common law; nor was
alimony. Alimony must find its basis in a divorce action and
is dependent upon an existing marriage. In this connection
Utah has provided for "alimony" after marriage as an incident
of a divorce proceeding. 'See Title 30, Chapters 3 and 4, Utah
Code Anno., 1953. It is submitted that there is no provision
in our codes nor any judicial decision which allows a nonresident woman to enter our courts to determine an allowance
of alimony and support for herself or for a child, in the manner
here sought, after a divorce decree of another state terminates
the marital status.
Counsel for plaintiff wife will undoubtedly refer this
court to several decisions wherein separate alimony actions
after divorce have been permitted, but every single case is justified only by reason of the statutory law of that particular state
permitting an alimony action separate and apart from seeking
a divorce. Approximately six jurisdictions have statutes with
provisions more or less similar to that of Ohio, but Utah has
no such statute:
Page's Ohio Gen. Code Anno.
Section 11980 ... rrExcept in an action for alimony
alone, plaintiff must have been a resident of the state
at least one year ... !he court shall hear and determine
the case whether the marriage took place, or the divorce
occttrred, within or without the state."
Note: Wick vs. Wick, 58 Ohio App. 72, 15 NE 2d 780,
admits that Ohio is among a minority of jurisdictions
permitting separate alimony actions as provided by the
foregoing statute.

13
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Statutes of Oklahoma:
Section 1284. Alimony without Divorce.
"The wife or husband may obtain alimony from the
other without a divorce, in an action brought for that
purpose in the District Court, for any of the causes for
which a divorce may be granted."

Similar statutes are found in Kentucky, Kansas, Florida,
Georgia and a very few other states.
Our statutes are not sufficiently broad to permit plaintiff
to enter our courts, nor do they give our courts jurisdiction
to entertain the subject matter of the action or to give the
relief originally sought. A careful persual of the provisions
of Chapter 3 of Title 30 of our Code will reveal that all
support provisions for both wife and child come under the
heading of "Divorce".
This contention is very clearly brought out in 27 CJS 1278
(which incidentally is the same rule adopted by the Restate·
ment of Conflict of Laws in Sec. 45 7 and 463, leaving the matter
up to the legislature):
rrunder a statute so providing, a court may award
alimony after a divorce has been granted outside the
state. The purpose of such a statute is to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the court and empower it to prevent, so
far as possible, the state from being a haven for former
husbands immigrating to it to avoid alimony obliga·
tions. While, in a suit under such a statute, allegations
as to other litigations and awards of alimony under the
divorce decree are impertinent and improper ... the
statute is permissive, rather than. mandatory . . . In
the absence of statutory authortty a suit whether
commenced before or after the rendition of' a foreign
1

14
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decree, to obtain an award of alimony as distinguished
from a suit to enforce a foreign decree from alimony
or to correct arrears thereunder, may not be maintained
after the court of another jurisdiction has granted a
divorce with or without alimony . . . "
The Maryland court (and there are many other decisions
to the same effect) has said in the case of Staub vs. Staub,
183 A. 610:

"We are unable to conclude that the right to maintain
a proceeding for alimony may survive the dissolution
of the marriage relation, since alimony is founded
upon the common law obligation of a husband to support his wife, which, in the absence of some saving
statute, must necessarily end by the passage of a decree
effectively dissolving the marriage tie, and it seems to
us that the cases in other jurisdictions adopting this
view are justified by justice and reason."
The New Jersey court, 10 N. ]. Eq. 138, in ruling upon
a New Jersey statute similar to the statutes of Utah and California, stated that the jurisdiction of the courts of equity in
cases of divorce and alimony are prescribed by statute authorizing the courts to render decrees for maintenance and alimony
when a divorce is decreed, and another providing that it shall
be lawful for the court to order alimony without connecting
such order with a decree for divorce, where the husband has,
without justifiable cause, abandoned his wife or separated himself from her, and refuses or neglects to maintain or provide
for her. The court held that the court of equity in New Jersey
had no jurisdiction to decree alimony alone, except in cases
expressly authorized by statute.

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is interesting to note that in 1938 New Jersey, by legis
lative action, provided that actions for alimony could be main
tained separate and apart from divorce actions, thus alterin~
the foregoing court ruling based upon prior statutory law.

The Restatement of Conflict of Laws has left the matteJ
of alimony entirely to the legislature:

Section 457.
"A state has legislative jurisdiction to impose upon
one person a duty to support another person if, (b) the
person to support is domiciled within the state although
the person to be supported is not subject to the juris·
diction of the state . . . "
Section 463.
"Alimony can, in its discretion, be granted by a
court under the law of its own state . . . "
In the case of Bowman vs. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522,
the court indicated, in interpreting statutes similar to those
of Utah, that alimony is an incident to divorce and it may be
allowed, under the phraseology of the Arkansas statute, only
as an incident of divorce and in connection with the divorce.
This defendant further maintains that plaintiff must,
even if this court were to permit her to maintain an independent
action, plead the required residency for three months as re·
quired in divorce actions. This point was not involved in
Hutton vs. Dodge, since the wife had previously been a residenl
of Utah when the divorce proceeding commenced, but the courl
answered the issue in unequivocal terms:
16
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"She could not follow her husband into another state
and obtain relief for she would first have to establish
a residence there before she could sue."
Plaintiff may contend that the issue of a three-month
residency period is a mere formality in pleading the rr cause
of action" and that it is not a jurisdictional requirement. In
answer to this contention the Utah case of Weiss vs. Weiss
( 1947), 111 Utah 353, 179 Pac. 2d 1005, has taken a definite
stand:

"If it (the Court) finds that there was no such residence, it has no power to further act as to the marriage
contract; and if it acts in such regard, it exceeds its
authority."
"As the plaintiff did not have the residence required
by the statute the district court did not obtain jurisdiction of the status of marriage in this case and any
judgment or order made in reference thereto is of no
effect."
In the second count of her complaint plaintiff attempted
to set forth a claim for reimbursement to hersel~ for past
amounts spent for herself and the minor child. In answer to
the jurisdictional matter involved in such a claim, the very
recent California case of Dimon vs. Dimon (May 27, 1952California District Court of Appeals) 244 Pac. 2d 972 at 978
answers the point raised in plaintiff's second count:
"Respondent has not cited any case in which it was
held that an action for support of children could be
maintained under such circumstances and we have
found none. Here the action was not brought by the
minor children, nor by the mother as their guardian.
17
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The action was brought by the mother mainly .to reimburse herself for moneys which she had patd out
in the support of the minors. No reason .has been advanced why there should be distinction ( m the matter
of the court's jurisdiction) between a recovery for the
wife's own support and a reimbursement of moneys
paid for the children.''
This writer refers the court to the case of Dimon vs.
Dimon as a very clear analysis of the general problem involved
in this entire action. In fact, the Dimon case cites the Utah
case of Hutton vs. Dodge as an exception to the general rule
against allowing a wife to bring a subsequent alimony action
and, in so doing, gives it the same limited scope that the annotators of ALR have given it. No case can be found which interprets the exception of Hutton vs. Dodge to be extended
to non-residents entering our courts. To so extend the exception would be for the courts to usurp the functions of the
legislature.
In a separate concurring optruon at page 979 Justice
Goodell quoted five sections of the California Civil Code,
basically similar to our Utah Code sections referring to divorce,
and stated:
"The language of the 5 sections just emphasized
shows a consistent and studied legislative purpose to
confine and limit the powers of the court to the period
of time .when actions for ~ivorce, .annulment and separate mamtenance are pendmg, which of course includes
time on appeal, 1049, Code Civ. Proc., and such further
time (e.g., during minority, or by a reservation in a
decree) ~s ~ay be properly within the scope of the
same action.
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" ... In the pending case the wife, after her Connecticut divorce had become final, sought and obtained,
in a new independent action with no underlying California antecedents an alimony order in this state of
which she was not a resident. It is difficult to see how
this could be accomplished."
It is interesting to note that on appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the case of Dimon vs. Dimon was affirmed in
a lengthy decision. It can be found at 254 Pac. 2d 528 and was
decided on April 25, 1953. It is also interesting to note that
the subject of child support was thoroughly discussed. In this
connection, California, like Utah, provides that child support
and alimony are proper incidents of divorce decree only by
virtue of statute. However, California now has a special statutory law allowing the mother to bring an action in her own
name on behalf of the child, separate and apart from a divorce
action. This is found in Civil Code 13 7.1 :

137.1 Action for support, maintenance and education
of children. "When a father or mother has the duty to
provide for the support, maintenance and education of
the children of the father and mother and wilfully fails
to provide for such support, maintenance and education,
the father or mother, as the case may be, or any child
by its guardian ad litem, may maintain an action in
the superior court against the mother or father, or
both, as the case may be, for the support, maintenance
and education of said children."
Similarly, the State of New York has provided a special
law by Section 13 7, subdivision 1 of the Domestic Relations
Court of the City of New York:

"If the marriage relationship shall have been terminated by final decree of the Supreme Court of the State
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of New York or by a judgment of any other court of
competent jurisdiction, when valid in the State of New
York, a petition may be filed for an order for support
made or enforced in the family court only for the benefit
of a child of such marriage."
From the foregoing statutes (of which Utah has no similar
provision) the only way that a mother can sue in her name after
divorce, and in the manner contemplated by the two counts
of plaintiff's original complaint, is by virtue of a special
statute. In the absence of. such a statute, as indicated in the
Dimon case, plaintiff would have to bring her action in Utah
on behalf of the child only-and not for herself-either as
guardian ad litem of the child or by using the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provisions. This matter
will be again referred to at a later point.
It is interesting to note that when Dimon vs. Dimon was
affirmed on appeal, Justice Traynor, the only justice who dissented in part (and who will undoubtedly be quoted by plaintiff), acknowledged that a state such as California (or Utah)
should not entertain an action of the type here brought if
the state of the matrimonial domicile (New York) would not
have entertained such an action ( 254 Pac. 2d 528 at 541):

"A former wife, however, would not be permitted
to bring an action in California for support following
an ex parte decree, i.f a similar action would not be
entertained by courts of the state where she was domiciled. at the time of the decree ..... the full faith and
credtt clause would compel Cahfornra to give the same
e~ect to the deere~ and hold that the decree not only
drssolved the marnage status but terminated the wife's
right to support ... If the husband obtained the decree
20
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in another state and under the law of the state of the
wife's domicile her right to support was lost when the
marriage status terminated, she would likewise be not
allowed, by migrating to another state, to revive a
right that had expired."
Now let us look at the New York cases since plaintiff
is and was a resident of the State of New York. In a case of
'
this kind, New York would not have entertained the claim
for alimony and child support set forth in plaintiff's complaint. In the case of Adler vs. Adler (1948) 192 Misc. 953-, 81
NYS 2d 797, the New York court pointed out that the basis
for an alimony action is the existence of a conventional marital
relationship, and that no action for support in favor of the
wife would lie where the relationship had been severed by a
decree of a court having competent jurisdiction.
In the case of Harris vs. Harris (1952) 979 App Div.
542, 110 NYS 2d 824, the husband secured an Illinois divorce,
based upon constructive service against the non-resident wife.
It was held that the validity of the foreign decree barred the
wife from claiming temporary alimony since the foreign decree
destroyed the very ground upon which the wife's complaint
necessarily rested. Other New York cases in point and to
the same effect are Taffel vs. Taffel ( 1943) 181 Misc. 259,
43 NYS 2d ~77, Standish vs. Standish ( 1943) 179 Misc.
564, 40 NYS 2d 538, and Davies vs. Davies (1946) 187 Misc.
313, 62 NYS 2d 790.

After the filing of this defendant's Amended Answer, the
plaintiff interjected and substituted an entirely new cause of
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action in place of her original counts by means of a pleadin~
designated as a "Reply" (R. 19). Over the objections of thi~
defendant raised on a Motion to Strike and Dismiss, Judge
Baker permitted the Reply to stand. It is submitted that the
court's ruling was clearly erroneous, as will hereinafter appear
The sum and substance ~f the Reply, as claimed by counsel
for plaintiff in objecting to the granting of an Intermediatf
Appeal by this Court (the file of which is in the office of thf
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court and contains the followin~
quoted statement), was that the wife was setting up a new
and substituted cause of action on the theory of separate main.
tenance:
" ... That by this Complaint and reply, the wife
sets up a cause of action for her own support, as the
legal wife of the husband, and for the support of the
minor child of these parties . . . "
From the foregoing statement, it appears that the plaintiff
abandoned the first two counts of the complaint and substituted
an entirely new cause of action, the new "cause of action"
being based on the assumption that the Nevada decree was
totally null and void, that she was still the legally married
wife of the defendant and that her theory of recovery was
separate maintenance. In short, she did a flip-flop.
Under Rule 7 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
this Reply should never have been allowed to be introduced
The defendant maintains that he has been denied due proces~
of law under the Constitutions of the State of Utah and oJ
the United States in that he is not granted, under Rules 7 (a)
and 12 (a), an opportunity to appear and defend against th~
22
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allegations of a "Reply" which attempts to introduce a new
cause of action, particularly where he may have affirmative
matter to plead in defense thereto.

If the Court will examine the "Reply" (R. 19) the following facts will be noted:

( 1) It sets forth matter entirely contradictory to that
raised in the complaint, and adopts a new theory;

( 2) In and of itself it does not set forth any cause of
action;
( 3) When viewed in connection with the complaint,
it still fails to supply the necessary ingredients
to plead a cause of action for separate maintenance or any other claim;
( 4) If it seeks to set aside the Nevada decree of
divorce, it certainly does not ask for such relief,
nor does it pray for any relief; and
( 5) If it conceivably sets forth a cause of action for
separate maintenance, it must relate back to the
original complaint. In so doing, the plaintiff
pleads herself out of court because the complaint
alleges that there exists a separate agreement

(R. 1).
6 ALR

p. 75 citing cases) :

"Generally a separation agreement between husband
and wife which is not inequitable is a defense to the
wife's action or suit for separate maintenance."
This writer frankly admits that he was, and is, in a
quandry as to just what plaintiff was attempting to do or plead
by her Reply. Although Judge Baker permitted the Reply to
stand and even granted a motion permitting travel expense
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money from New York based upon such Reply (which Judge
Lewis later set aside on contempt proceedings), it was not entirely clear until after written briefs had been submitted during
certain phases of the case and until the actual "trial" of the
case, that plaintiff had thoroughly and completely reversed
her theory of action. This writer attempted to secure a statement from plaintiff's counsel as to just what he was attempting
to do by means of this Reply, but counsel would neither commit
himself nor clarify his stand.

If plaintiff has succeeded in raising a new cause of action
by her "Reply," this writer will seriously consider re-learning
all of the pleading which he has ever known. Without citing
a large number of cases, the writer will merely refer to standard
legal texts:
41 AM JUR, PLEADING:
SEC. 177. FORM, CONTENTS, AND SUFFICIENCY-"The replication or reply should not materially
depart from the plaintiff's initial pleading, nor reassign
or repeat the allegations contained therein, for it is no
part of the office of a reply to allege matters which
are necessarily a part of the cause of action and which
must be sustained by the plaintiff's proof in opening
... The replication or reply should relate back to the
plaintiff's initial pleading and re-enforce the cause of
action therein pleaded . . . "
SEC. 179. OPERATION AND EFFECT-"It is
clear. from the ~unction of a ~eply, as above explained,
that zt cannot azd the complaz'!t by supplying omissions
therein, broadening its scope, or adding new grounds
of relief." . . .
SEC. 185. WHAT CONSTITUTES-" .
The
plaintiff in his replication or reply will not be p~r~itted
24
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to materially change the position taken by him in his
initial pleading and bring forward a new and distinct
cause of action from that declared on."
SEC. 187. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONs-" ...
there is a departure when the plaintiff's reply brings
forward a distinct cause of action from that declared
on in the complaint."
In connection with the filing of a reply in the manner
here attempted, our Utah court in the case of Combined
Metals, Inc., vs. Bastian, 267 Pacific 1020, 71 Utah 535 at page
554, has made the following declaration:
"The reply thus was not only inconsistent within
itself, but stated a different cause, on a different theory,
on a different ground, and on a different contract from
that stated in the complaint, and was a complete departure therefrom. It, of course, is familiar doctrine
that where allegations of a declaration are repugnant
to and inconsistent with each other, they thereby
neutralize each other and render the declaration bad
The purpose of the foregoing argument relating to the
Reply is pertinent to this appeal for the reason that if the two
original counts in plaintiff's complaint failed because the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint,
then the Reply, since it must relate back to the complaint and
since its very validity and existence is based upon the complaint,
should have also been stricken on jurisdictional grounds as
well. The Reply, if it be_ conceded as the proper subject for a
Reply, cannot cure the jurisdictional defect inherent in the
Complaint.
An examination of the transcript will show that the evi25
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dence which counsel for plaintiff introduced at the trial related
wholly and solely to the attempt to set aside the Nevada
divorce decree. In other words, all of the evidence that was
introduced related to the cause of action allegedly set forth
in the Reply. There was absolutely no evidence touching upon
the two counts of the Complaint. As such, the evidence should
have been inadmissible. And since the Complaint failed for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, no evidence should have
been admitted relating to the Reply.

(II)
Ez'n if the court had jurisdiction, it erred in permitting the

filing of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint after trial.
After the trial of the case-at which neither the plaintiff
nor any witnesses in her behalf appeared-and after attacking the validity of the Nevada decree in all respects, including
the portion relating to child support, plaintiff's attorney was
permitted to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint
(R. 44). It was upon this pleading that judgment on the
pleadings was given. As stated heretofore, despite attacking
the Nevada decree in all respects in the Reply, the Amended
and Supplemental Complaint was based entirely upon the
Nevada decree and every provision therein contained.
This defendant maintains that the court improperly allowed plaintiff to file the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. If we refer to Rule 15 (b) and (d) of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedur~, we will find the following provisions for
allowing the filing of amended and supplemental pleadings:

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RULE 15
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE. When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleading
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant
a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
(d) SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or
occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the
court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead
thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor."
Defendant wishes to point out to the court, and the transcript of the testimony at the trial (containing only evidence
elicited from defendant when called as a witness by counsel
for plaintiff) so indicates, that the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint did not relate to any "issue not raised by the plead-
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ings which was tried by express or implied consent of th1
parties ... " In fact, the Nevada decree of divorce was no
even offered in evidence at the trial but was only incorporatec
in the pleadings on behalf of the parties for limited purposes
Specifically, plaintiff took the position that the Nevada decret
was not binding on the right of child support. This statement
can be found in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's original Complaint
(R. 2):
" ... There was no final adjudication as to the ...
right of this plaintiff . . . to receive support money
for the support of her minor child."
In this defendant's Amended Answer, he answered and
agreed to plaintiff's contention concerning child support, as
follows (R. 22) :
"Defendant admits that said adjudication was not
binding on the right of plaintiff to receive support
money for the support of the minor child of the parties."
From the pleadings and from the evidence introduced at
the trial, there was no issue before the court concerning the
effect of the Nevada decree on the :ight of plaintiff to secure
child support. From the clear-cut allegations of the pleadings
and evidence, it can hardly be seen how the amended com·
plaint related to " . . . issues not raised by the pleadings"
which were " . . . tried by express or implied consent of the
parties." Furthermore, the rule is mandatory that the amendments must "conform to the evidence ... " Defendant submits
that there is not a scintilla of evidence on plaintiff's behalf
which will supply any single ingredient necessary to grantinB
28
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permission to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint.
All of plaintiff's evidence was precisely to the contrary.
In the case of Apex Smelting Co. z·s. Burns, C. A. Illinois,
1949, 179 Fed. 2d 978, interpreting Federal Rule 15, it was
stated:
"Here, for the first time plaintiff advances the theory
that defendants were liable on breach of contract ... "
Quoting from 79 F. Supp. 654, 658:
"The effect of the amendment they propose would
be not to conform the pleadings to a judgment they
had won, but to jeopardize and perhaps to overthrow
a judgment they had lost. If this latter application of the
rule were permitted, a losing party, by motions to
amend and rehear, could keep a case in court indefinitely, trying one theory of recovery or defense after
another, in the hope of finally hitting upon a successful
one."
Also, U.S. vs. Southern Pacific Co. (Oregon), 75 F. Supp.
336 at 339, states:
"A new and distinct lawsuit should never be injected
into a case by filing a supplemental pleading. This
rule is inherent in all systems of pleading, common law,
code or federal. It is required by the necessities. Confusion would otherwise result."
Another matter was brought up after trial which did not
conform to the pleadings or any evidence introduced at the
trial. Counsel for plaintiff in the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint asked for counsel fees in the sum of $300.00. No
plea for counsel fees (other than for temporary fees) was raised
in the original Complaint or Reply, nor was any mention of
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the same included in the evidence introduced at the trial. Thf
request for this relief was apparently an afterthought on th(
part of counsel .to secure something which was not asked fot
at the proper time. The court allowed counsel the sum of
$200.00 as attorney's fees, apparently based upon securing
child support under the Nevada decree. In this connection,
after trial, when plaintiff's counsel asked for judgment on
the pleadings (the Amended and Supplemental Complaint
and the Answer thereto) he admitted on cross-examination that
despite the fact that he put forth legal services in the original
action (in which plaintiff failed to prevail) in the sum of
about $1,250.00 to $1,500.00 (R. 93), he merely made an
appearance in court asking for judgment on the amended and
supplemental pleadings, and drew up a short Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. For these services plaintiff was
granted judgment for $200.00. It appears that the court
was, in effect, basing the allowance of counsel fees upon an
abortive effort to show the invalidi~ of the Nevada decree.
Since the allegation requesting attorney's fees was the
only "supplemental" portion of the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, we are faced with the rule announced in the case of
Randolph vs. Missouri R. Co. et al 78 F. Supp. 727 at 729:
1

of

"A supplemental petition,
course, must be based
upon t~ings that have occurred since the filing of the
original complaint and must be based upon the same
cause of action as the original complaint."
Since the Third District Court had no jurisdiction to enter·
tain the original causes of action set forth in plaintiffs original
Complaint and her Reply, the Amended and Supplemental
30
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Complaint permitted by Judge Van Cott after trial cannot cure
the jurisdictional defect. For that reason, on jurisdictional
grounds alone, the final judgment is null and void.
When plaintiff tried to assert a new cause of action after
trial in her Amended and Supplemental Complaint based upon
the decree of the State of Nevada, the applicable portion of
which she had previously steadfastly maintained to be invalid,
it is very clear that a new and distinct law:suit was injected
into the action upon a point which was moot and made res
judicata by prior pleadings of the parties.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. vs. Consolidated Fisheries Co.
(Delaware) 94 F. Supp. 311 at 320:

" . . . Now, after losing its case, defendant shifts
its position and proposes amendments alleging an action
sounding in tort ... The effect of the pro2osed amendments is to reopen the case and relitigate the question
of defendant's liability . . . The . . . action of a court
permitting such amendments is based on the court's
discretion and this cannot be an unbridled discretion."
Quoting (see R. 92 and 93) from the case of New York
Central & H.R.R.Co. vs. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 346, 43 S. Ct.
122, 123, that court stated:
"The first special defense is that the amended complaint set forth new and distinct causes of action, which
were not contained in the original complaint and were
not brought within the time limited by law ... I think
the defense is good."
Concerning the power of a court to permit an amendment
in the manner sought in this action, the Utah case of Combined Metals, Inc. vs. Bastian (supra) also clearly set forth
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the proposition advanced by this defendant at 71 Utah, page
554:
" ... a cause of action alleged in an amende~ ~eti
tion, though founded on the same grievance o~ lnJury
as that described in the original, is a different cause of
action, if it is dependent upon different grounds for
holding the defendant responsible for the wrong alleged; and that the power of a court to permit an
amendment of a pleading does not authorize an importation which in effect introduces a new or different
cause of action."
Since the portion of the Nevada decree relating to child
support was admittedly invalid according to the allegations of
both parties in the pleadings in this case, this matter became
res judicata and was improperly brought forth by an amendment to plaintiffs complaint. Although this defendant set
up the bulk of the Nevada decree as a bar to plaintiff's
action, and in so doing set forth the provisions of the decree
for that purpose, the plaintiff cannot now claim that other
parts of the decree should now constitute a new cause of action.
In the case of Simms vs. Andrews, C. C. A. Oklahoma}
1941, 118 Fed. 2d 803, it was held that an amendment to the

pleadings to conform to proof is not authorized merely because
evidence, which is competent and material upon issues created
by the pleadings, incidentally tends to prove another fact not
within the issues in the case. Furthermore, in the case of Town
of Texhoma vs. Neild, 9 F.R.D. 739 at 741, the court made
the following observation:
"The matters set up in the supplemental pleading
are matters that could have been set up in the original
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complaint and litigated in the hearing that resulted in
a judgment for the plaintiff. Under all the authorities
such matters thus sought to be litigated in the supplemental pleading are now res judicata."
Quoting from the foregoing case of Simms vs. Andrews,
which is a case from our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
we find this statement at page 807:
"The right to amend pleadings to conform to the
proof proceeds upon the theory that by such amendment
the pleadings are brought in line with the actual issues
upon which the case was tried ...
Also, U. S. vs. Brookhaven, 134 Fed. 2d 442 at 446:
" . . . The provision of Rules of Civil Procedure
15 (b), 28 U.S.C.A .... looks to supporting the judgment by amendments, or to making the record show
more perfectly what was tried and decided. It does
not authorize an amendment to nullify the judgment
and begin a new contest."
In the case of Sears Roebuck & Co. vs. Marhenke, C. C. A.
California, 1941, 121 Fed. 2d 598, it was held that Rule 15 (b)
applies only in a case in which issues not raised by the pleadings were tried by express or implied consent of the parties.
The federal case of Popovitch vs. Kasperlik ( 1947), 76
F. Supp. 223 at 239, clearly indicates the tests to be applied
Rule 15 (b) before allowing an amendment:
"The tests to be applied when the question arises
whether an amended complaint should be filed are-would a judgment bar any further action on either,
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does the same measure of damages support both, is the
same defense open in each, and is the same measure
of proof required."
Now, if we apply the tests set forth in the Popovich case
to the Amended and Supplemental Complaint in the case before this Court, we can see that the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint fell far short of meeting those tests:

First: The measure of damages allowed under the first
judgment (Order) (R. 41) following the trial of the matter,
and under the theory upon which the case was tried, did not
provide any back amounts to be recovered by the plaintiff. On
the other hand, plaintiff was allowed to recover judgment for
$1435.00 back support under the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint.
Second: The same defense is not open to each action. In
the action, as tried, the defense to the pleading and proof was
that the Nevada decree was subsisting and valid except as to
the award for child support. However, when the entire Nevada
decree was introduced as the basis of a new cause of action,
the defense as to the child support provision had to be other
than the existence of the decree itself.
Third: It is quite obvious that the same measure of proof
is much different under the theory of the Amended and Sup·
plemental Complaint than it was under the theory that the
Nevada decree was invalid. Under the latter theory the intro·
duction of the decree standing alone, in the absence of an
affirmative defense, constituted the only proof needed as to
make it the de~ree of the Utah court. However, at the trial,
34
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all of the proof and evidence was directed to setting aside
and nullifying that very decree.

(III)
Even if the court had jurisdiction and if it properly allowed
the filing of the amended and supplemental pleadings, it
erred in granting judgment on the amended and supplemental
pleadings.

After plaintiff was permitted to file the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, this defendant answered the same and,
as a first defense, raised the objections previously referred to
under Rule 15 (b) and (d) and also objected to the allowance
of any attorney's fee. As a second defense, this defendant
alleged that the evidence introduced and admitted at the trial
proved that an agreement existed by and between the parties
whereby the plaintiff agreed to support the minor child, and
that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover any alleged
amounts of money based upon the Nevada decree of divorce,
or otherwise, for any period of time up to the time of the filing
of plaintiff's amended and supplemental complaint.
As a third defense, this defendant raised the issue--made
moot by the prior pleadings-that the court of the State of
Nevada did not have the jurisdiction over the person of the
minor child for the reason that it was not before the court
and that the provision respecting the child was inserted by
the Nevada court upon the court's own initiative and without
any consent of this defendant.
Suffice it to say, in addition to the arguments previously set
forth relating to this issue, that the Restatement of Conflict
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of Laws has covered this point, indicating that the child must
have been domiciled in Nevada:
"54. Status.

( 1) A state which creates any status oth.er than a
domestic status has jurisdiction over 1t.

( 2) A state has jurisdiction over the domestic status
of persons domiciled within the state."
''Comments:
c. "Domestic status" is the status of husband and

wife, or of a child and a parent or guardian."
As a fourth defense to the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, this defendant denied the allegation as to whether
the minor child is now self-supporting or has need of support.
In fact, the defendant does not actually know whether or not
the child is now alive and in existence or whether the mother
is remarried. For all he knows, the child could be deceased and
the mother could be simply attempting to secure money on a
pretense. Furthermore, it does not appear that the plaintiff
has affixed her name to any paper or pleading found in the
record; and she certainly never appeared to give any evidence,
either in person or in any other manner. Based upon a total
dearth of evidence and a clear-cut denial in the Answer to
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R. 51), upon
what theory can the Court's fourth finding of fact (the last
line thereof) (R. 99), and which is not even included in
the Conclusions of Law, be justified?
It should be noted that despite the fact that plaintiff knew
of this defendant's whereabouts for over 2'l2 years following
36
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the Nevada decree, no demand for alimony or support or
maintenance was ever made. This was consistent with defendant's understanding of the agreement existing between the
parties. Despite such fact, this defendant is again pointing out
that the minor child should not be barred from recovering
against either of its parents for support simply because the
parents entered into an agreement concerning the keeping
and custody of the child. However, as between the parents,
such an agreement is binding-at least as to past amounts of
support allegedly expended by either parent. Evidence concerning such an agreement was brought forth at the hearing
on the matter by this defendant, the only person to testify on
either side.
See Krotsky vs. Krotsky (1915) 169 App. Div. 850, 155
N. Y.S. 625 and Pierce vs. Pierce ( 1911) 71 N. Y. 154, 117
A.L.R. 1184, as stating the rule that conduct similar to that
in the case at bar; i.e., the lapse of time and an express or
implied agreement, constituted a waiver of her right to recover
past amounts expended for the support of herself and the
minor children.
In allowing amendments the court should never permit
the same to work an in justice on either party. In the case of
Hirschhorn vs. Mine Safety Appliances Co. ( 1951 101 F. Supp.
549 at 552, which involved an amendment before trial, it was
stated:
"The primary question is whether or not the amendment will work injustice on any of the parties."
Under the circumstances of this case, it seems manifestly
unfair to permit plaintiff to amend her complaint after trial
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and allow her to recover on the very decree she sought to have
set aside. This becomes all the more unfair when we examine
the statement of plaintiff's counsel (R. 93) concerning the
amount of work and the reasonable value, if not more so, than
plaintiff's attorney, since this defendant was on the defensive
throughout the action?
The uncontradicted evidence brought out the existence
of an agreement between the parties relating to child support
and custody. This was permitted to stand by Judge Baker as
a defense to the claim to past support money claimed to be
due (R. 27). Furthermore, at the trial, Judge VanCott also recognized the defense as valid (R. 74):
MR. ARNOVITZ: Now at this time we would like
to strike all evidence with respect to any agreement
that was made with the mother for her own support and
the support of the child for the reason and on the
grounds that such an agreement would be contrary to
public policy.
MR. FULLER: In that connection we agree it is
contrary to public policy insofar as the child is concerned, but not insofar as the action brought by the
wife against this defendant for past amounts due.
THE COURT: Well, I would think that is correct,
Mr. Arnovitz, isn't it? It may be against public policy
so far as the child is concerned and it wouldn't be binding, but as to herself she could make such an agreement.
From the foregoing statement, it clearly appears that
Judge Van Cott abused his discretion in allowing plaintiff to
recover back support money on a different theory-and one
which was made moot by all prior pleadings-for back support
38
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money which he himself recognized could not be recovered
under the theory of the case, as tried, by reason of the existence
of an agreement which was not controverted by any evidence
submitted by plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

It is anticipated that counsel for plaintiff will attempt
to influence the court with the argument that the minor child
of the parties is willfully being neglected by its father. Such
is not the case. This defendant is willing, and has offered, to
assist in the support of the child despite the contention that
an agreement between the defendant and plaintiff heretofore
existed to the effect that she did not wish him to do so.
This defendant has been involved in continuous and
harassing litigation for more than one year. He submits that
if the minor child of these parties is actually in need of
support, he will be amenable to furnishing such support, but
absolutely will not pay any money directly to the plaintiff
for amounts which she claims are due to her for past support
furnished to the minor child. Defendant submits that the child
will possibly never see such payments, that the child has actually
been supported by its maternal grandparents who are people
of fairly substantial means, and that the mother will merely
spend the money for her own pleasure.
There are procedures whereby this defendant can be accorded his full and complete rights under the law and whereby
the minor child can secure needed support and maintenance
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from its father. As indicated in the first Dimon vs. Dimot
case ( 244 Pac. 2d at page 976-7), in a state such as Utah
which does not have a specific statute allowing a parent to
bring an action against the other parent for child support jn
the absence of an actual divorce proceeding, the child's right
to support (which existed at common law and which still
exists) is transitory and will follow the father wherever he
may be. However, in the absence of such statutory provision,
the mother can only bring the action as guardian ad litem for
the child. Under such circumstances, the court can provide
sufficient safeguards to see that the monies paid are actually
expended on behalf of the child.
Another and better remedy which is available to plaintiff
-and which should be used if she does not seek to personally
come before the Utah courts-is that of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. This remedy was also
pointed out in the first Dimon vs. Dimon case. Had plaintiff
followed this procedure and filed a petition in the proper court
of New York, she could have secured support for the child
many months ago and this defendant (and the Utah courts)
would have been fully informed as to all aspects of the case
and the needs of the child.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
was created out of the necessity for providing a means of secur·
ing support in just such a situation as this. The defendant will
necessarily have to submit to such an action if it is brought, but
he will at least have the knowledge that the child will be be·
fore the court in New York, and he and the proper courts will
have an opportunity to ascertain the needs of the child.
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This court may find that the jurisdictional argument set
forth in this brief has never been raised before by any other
member of the bar. However, merely because the point is
raised for the first time on appeal, that fact alone should be
no reason for disregarding the argument herein contained. The
writer has made a very thorough and systematic study of the
subject of jurisdiction and the divorce statutes of various states
in arriving at the conclusions herein reached.
Counsel for this defendant wishes to anticipate part of
the defense which plaintiff may raise in her brief. In this connection, the following points are pertinent:
( 1) Some cases might be cited with dicta apparently contra
to those herein included relating to the allowance of alimony,
but most relate to an allowance of alimony in an "independent"
action before a divorce is secured.

(2) Each and every case cited wherein alimony has been
allowed after divorce should be carefully checked against the
statutes of the respective states.
( 3) All cases cited, whether federal or otherwise, involving an interpretation of Rule 15(b) and (d) should be
carefully checked to make sure that the cases do not involve
amendments before trial and judgment, since such situations
are subject to more relaxed principles.

It is submitted that the plaintiff has pursued an incorrect
procedure from the very commencement of her action. In view
of the arguments and the foregoing, it is submitted that the
judgment entered by Judge Ray Van Cott on May 7, 1953·,
should be set aside as null and void, and that plaintiff be re41
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quired to proceed as guardian ad litem in a transitory action
or under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
or by such other remedies as are available, so that this defendant
may have the opportunity of fully knowing what is expected
and demanded of him as to the future support of his minor
child and, at the same time, be assured that the child personally receives the benefits of such future payments.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
705-7 First Security Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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